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KNOWING WHEN TO SAY WHEN: FEDERAL




0 N MARCH 8, 1990, a drunk cockpit crew flew North-
west Flight 650 from Fargo, North Dakota to Minne-
apolis-St. Paul, Minnesota. Blaming the 1986 merger of
Northwest Airlines and Republic Airlines on the creation
of tension between Northwest pilots and former Republic
crews,' the crew decided to get together in a bar the night
before a morning flight to talk things over.2 During the
course of their conversation, the captain of the aircraft
drank nineteen rum and cokes.3 The other officers con-
sumed at least six pitchers of beer between the two of
them.4
Prior to takeoff the next, morning, a Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA or Administration) Flight Standards
Inspector detained Flight 650's crew for approximately
one hour. He confronted the pilots about their drinking
festivities on the prior evening after receiving an anony-
Children of Alcoholics Are Less Impaired by Alcohol, Defense Witness Testifies in North-
west Pilots' Case, AIR SAFETY WK., Aug. 20, 1990, at 2 [hereinafter Northwest Pilots'
Case].
2 Id.
3 See Federal Felony Charges Filed Against Allegedly Intoxicated Crew, AIR SAFETY WK.,
Mar. 26, 1990, at 2 [hereinafter Federal Felony]; Federal Grand Jury Indicts Crewmen
Accused of Flying While Intoxicated, AIR SAFETY WK., Apr. 9, 1990, at 3 [hereinafter
Grand Jury Indicts].
4 Northwest Pilots' Case, supra note 1, at 2.
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mous tip.5 When the inspector warned the crew that they
would violate Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR's) if the
allegations were true and if they chose to fly, the crew de-
nied the drinking allegations. 6 Northwest Airlines also re-
ceived a tip at their reservations center before the flight
departed from Fargo. Although both the FAA and
Northwest had reason to know of the serious threat to
public safety, the plane took off as scheduled.
Fortunately for the ninety-one passengers aboard, the
aircraft landed safely. Upon arrival at the Minneapolis-St.
Paul airport, another FAA flight inspector arrested the
three crew members' and arranged for blood-alcohol test-
ing.9 The results of the tests were chilling.' 0 The cap-
tain's blood alcohol level exceeded 0.1% - the level at
which most states deem it illegal to drive a car." The two
officers co-piloting the flight had blood alcohol levels of
more than the federal limit of 0.04%.2 Each of the three
Jay C. Lowndes & Sid Goldstein, Following Arrest of Flight Crew on Alcohol
Charges, Busey Tells Suspicious Inspectors to Notify Airlines, AIR SAFETY WK., Mar. 19,
1990, at 1. Flight Standards Inspector Verl Addison received the anonymous tip
at approximately 1:30 a.m. Id.
6 Id. The applicable FAR prohibits consumption of alcohol within eight hours
before a flight. 14 C.F.R. § 91.17(a)(1)(1991).
7 Lowndes & Goldstein, supra note 5, at 3. Northwest's management apparently
did not receive the information until 6:40 a.m., after Flight 650 completed its forty
minute flight to Minneapolis. Id.
1 Id. Douglas R. Solseth received a telephone call from Addison, the Fargo
inspector. Solseth "performed a citizens arrest on all three crew members" when
the plane landed in Minneapolis. Id.
9 Current federal law does not require the pilots to submit to alcohol testing.
For a discussion of testing provisions see infra part IV and accompanying text.
The Minneapolis Flight Inspector and the Minneapolis Airport Police received the
crew's consent to test. 136 CONG. REC. S3,127-02 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 1990) (state-
ment of Sen. Danforth).
10 See 136 CONG. REC. S3,127-28 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 1990) (statement of Sen.
Danforth).
I Eric Weiner, Rules on Pilots' Drinking are Debated, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1990, at
24 [hereinafter Weiner, Rules on Drinking]. Research indicates that at a blood alco-
hol level approaching .12%, the number of major procedural errors during flight
triples. Flight 650's captain had a blood alcohol level of .13%, a fraction above
this extremely dangerous level. For a discussion of alcohol's effects upon pilots in
the air, see infra notes 40-52 and accompanying text.
12 Weiner, Rules on Drinking, supra note 11, at 24. The blood alcohol levels of
the two other crew pilots were .06% and .04%. Id.
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pled "not guilty" to federal felony charges that they flew
an aircraft while intoxicated,1 3 even though one of the
crew estimated he still had about three bottles of beer in
him during the early morning flight.' 4 That pilot also
maintained the alcohol neither impaired nor affected
him.' 5 A Minneapolis jury did not agree. It convicted the
entire crew for flying while intoxicated and sentenced the
pilots to jail.' 6
The Fargo incident directed the government's attention
to the rules which regulate the relationship between
drinking and flying. Vigorous administrative and con-
gressional efforts to tighten restrictions on drinking by pi-
lots now focus on the Fargo incident to emphasize the
great potential for tragedy.' 7 Critics of the movement to-
ward more stringent regulations maintain that a few mem-
bers of Congress and the public have overreacted and that
'3 Fired Pilots Plead Not Guilty to Federal and State Charges, AIR SAFETY WK., Apr. 16,
1990, at 4 [hereinafter Fired Pilots].
14 Northwest Pilots' Case, supra note 1, at 3.
15 Id.
16 United States v. Prouse, No. Crim. 4-90-51(1), 1990 WL 182335, at *3 (D.
Minn. Nov. 21, 1990), aff'd, 945 F.2d 1017 (8th Cir. 1991). U.S. District Judge
James Rosenbaum sentenced Norman Lyle Prouse, captain of the flight, to sixteen
months in jail. Id. Crewmembers Robert Kircher and Joseph Balzer each received
twelve month sentences. United States v. Prouse, 945 F.2d 1017, 1022 (8th Cir.
1991). The judge placed the three on supervised release. Id. Supervised release
is essentially probation.
'7 Airline And Rail Service Protection Act: Hearing on § 356 and § 362 Before the Senate
Comm. on Commerce, Science & Transportation, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1987) (state-
ment of Elizabeth Dole, Secretary, Department of Transportation). Secretary
Dole spoke generally about the potential for tragedy:
When we board an airline ... we literally put our lives in the hands
of others. The effective operation of any transportation system,
therefore, ultimately depends on a foundation of mutual trust and
confidence in the vigilance and responsibility of other people. The
abuse of drugs and alcohol by transportation workers in safety sensi-
tive functions is a life-threatening violation of that trust.
Id.
Roger Horn, president of Safe Travel America, questioned, "Why is it that air-
line passengers have less protection than cattle in a freight car?" Weiner, Rules on
Drinking, supra note 11, at 24. He stated that the Fargo incident illustrates that the
"traveling public needs the same kind of protection for alcohol use as it has for
drug use." Id.
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alcohol abuse does not run rampant through the aviation
industry.
This comment will initially examine the prevalence of
alcohol use by pilots and the effects of alcohol on the op-
eration of an aircraft. It will then evaluate the effective-
ness of the current regulations aimed at preventing pilots
from flying while intoxicated as well as the success of the
industry's rehabilitation program. Several proposed revi-
sions of the regulations that seek to strike a balance be-
tween the traveling public's right to air safety and a pilot's
privacy interests will be discussed. Finally, the comment
will address congressional attempts to mandate random
alcohol testing.
II. ALCOHOL AND PILOTS
Researchers began scrutinizing the relationship be-
tween alcohol and pilots during the mid-seventies, and
their efforts continue into the nineties. Current studies
typically concern the number of aviators who fall prey to
alcoholism as well as the effects of alcohol on in-flight per-
formance.' 8 The only consensus reached thus far is that
mixing alcohol and the operation of an airplane produces
a deadly combination.
A. PREVALENCE OF USE BY PILOTS
Although concrete statistical data indicating how many
pilots abuse alcohol do not exist, members of the Depart-
ment of Transportation (DOT), Congress, and the media
insist the number is substantial. 19 They base their estima-
I" See, e.g., Susan M. Ross & Leonard E. Ross, Pilot's Knowledge of Blood Alcohol
Levels, AIR LINE PILOT, Nov. 10, 1990, at v.
"I The Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on drugs and alcohol issued
on December 4, 1986, by the FAA indicated the Administration had far too little
data available regarding chemical dependence in the aviation community to con-
clude whether it threatened safety in the air. Dealing with Drugs and Alcohol in the
Rail and Airline Industries: Hearing Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government
Operations, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 63 (1987) [hereinafter Dealing with Drugs] (state-
ment of Richard B. Stone, Executive Chairman for Aeromedical Resources of the
Air Line Pilots Association).
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tions on an accumulation of information which includes:
the number of accidents in which alcohol is determined
causative, surveys in which pilots confess to alcoholism
and alcohol abuse, data regarding pilots with driving-
while-intoxicated (DWI) records, and the number of pi-
lots who enter the industry's voluntary rehabilitation
programs.
1. Accident Data
Accident data primarily provide information relevant to
establishing pilot drinking habits in general aviation. 20 A
large percentage of accidents in the non-commercial,
non-military aviation community can be attributed, at
least in part, to an over-consumption of alcoholic drinks
before or during flight.2' Between 1965 and 1975, the
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) 22 listed
"alcohol impairment of pilot judgment a deficiency" as
either the main cause or a contributing factor in 485 gen-
eral aviation accidents.23 Fatalities occurred in 430 of
those accidents. 24 The NTSB currently attributes six per-
cent of all aviation accidents to drug or alcohol use,
though others estimate that the number is closer to ten
20 STRONGER FAA REQUIREMENTS NEEDED TO IDENTIFY AND REDUCE ALCOHOL
USE AMONG CIVILIAN PILOTS, COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S REPORT TO THE CONG. 1
(1978) [hereinafter FAA REQUIREMENTS NEEDED]. General aviation includes "all
civil-aviation operations other than those conducted for remuneration or hire."
The term does not encompass military or commercial aeronautics. Jack G. Modell
& James M. Mountz, Drinhing and Flying-The Problem of Alcohol Use by Pilots, 323
NEW ENG. J. MED. 455 (1990).
21 Modell & Mountz, supra note 20, at 455. The fatal accident rate is actually
fairly low. Approximately 1.5 accidents per 100,000 hours of flight in fixed-wing
aircraft resulted in fatalities. Id.
22 The NTSB is an independent federal agency charged with investigating acci-
dents and determining their causes. FAA REQUIREMENTS NEEDED, supra note 20,
at 1.
23 Id. The NTSB uses a three level approach to determine if alcohol played a
role in an accident based on a pilot's blood alcohol concentration (BAC). If a
pilot's BAC is lower than 50 mg. percent, alcohol is ruled out as causative. The
NTSB deems alcohol a "factor" if a level of 50 mg. to 120 mg. percent is present.
Should the level exceed 120 mg. percent, alcohol "caused" the accident. Id.
24 Id.
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percent.25 For each accident caused by abuse, a pilot
drank too much or too close to take-off.
Far fewer accidents caused by alcohol plague the com-
mercial airlines and military aviation. Researchers claim,
however, that the amount of heavy alcohol use by airline
and military pilots does not differ substantially from gen-
eral aviators.26 Since 1983, the NTSB cited alcohol and
drug use as factors in only sixteen commercial accidents.
Those accidents each involved charter flights or com-
muter airlines.2 7 In fact, no fatal accident involving a ma-
jor United States commercial carrier has ever been
attributed to alcohol consumption by the pilot or crew.2 8
Nevertheless, many speculate that the statistical accident
rate underestimates the level of drinking by commercial
pilots.29
Those doubting the disposition of accident data in the
commercial aviation industry point to the number of pro-
fessional pilots who have lost their licenses due to alcohol
abuse.30 For example, since 1984 the FAA has revoked or
suspended the licenses of sixty-one pilots for flying while
25 For a discussion of the six percent estimate, see Eric Weiner, Drunken Flying
Persists Despite Treatment Effort, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 1990, at 6 [hereinafter Weiner,
Drunken Flying]. For evidence of the ten percent estimate, see Dealing With Drugs,
supra note 19, at 2 (statement of Cardiss Collins, Chairman of House Subcomm.
on Government Activities and Transportation).
26 Modell & Mountz, supra note 20, at 455.
217 See Weiner, Rules on Drinking, supra note 11, at 24; Weiner, Drunken Flying,
supra note 25, at 6.
28 Modell & Mountz, supra note 20, at 455. Captain Richard Stone clarified his
position:
[T]here is no evidence that drug or alcohol use is a significant prob-
lem in the airline industry. Since the beginning of commercial avia-
tion in the United States, a period of more than 50 years, in which
hundreds of certified carriers have flown over 100 million flights,
there has not been a single United States scheduled airline accident
attributable to alcohol or drug abuse.
Dealing with Drugs, supra note 19, at 62.
29 Weiner, Rules on Drinking, supra note 11, at 24. "[T]here is evidence that
drinking among pilots is more widespread than the accident statistics indicate."
Id.
so See id. The Northwest alcohol incident is the first involving a major airline,
according to JoAnn Sloan, an FAA spokeswoman. Id.
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intoxicated.'
2. Pilot Surveys
A recent survey questioned 1039 FAA-licensed pilots
about their consumption of alcohol. 2 The respondents
indicated that 21.8% considered themselves moderate
drinkers, and 15% classified their drinking as heavy. 33
When researchers then categorized the respondents as
either private or professional pilots, the statistics re-
mained essentially the same for both groups. Of the pri-
vate pilots, 22.5% were moderate drinkers and 14.8%
were heavy drinkers. 4 Professional pilots responded that
20.5% drank moderately, while 14.4% drank heavily.35 If
these statistics are true across the airline industry, com-
mercial pilots may experience a higher incidence of alco-
holism and alcohol abuse than that found in most other
industries. 6
3. Rehabilitation Statistics
The number of pilots who seek treatment in voluntary
airline rehabilitation programs suggests that concerns
about pilots overindulging in alcohol should not be put
aside merely for lack of definitive statistical evidence. The
United States government funded the Human Interven-
s1 Id.
:2 Susan M. Ross & Leonard E. Ross, Pilots' Knowledge of Blood Alcohol Levels and
the 0.0476 Blood Alcohol Concentration Rule, 61 AvIATION, SPACE & ENVTL. MED. 412-
17 (1990). The sample included pilots who held private, commercial and air




36 Panels of experts addressed a group of 107 members of the aviation industry
on the substance abuse issue, including union and nonunion pilots, national
union representatives, large and small airlines, FAA and NTSB regulators, Con-
gressmen, and aeromedical physicians. The speakers stated that "in any em-
ployee group, 8 to 10 percent will develop alcoholism" and that no data indicate
that aviators suffer from a higher prevalence of alcoholism than other population
segments. Esperison Martinez, Addressing Alcohol Problems, AIR LINE PILOT, Nov.
1990 (Supp.), at iv. If the commercial pilots surveyed by Ross and Ross repre-
sented the whole of commercial pilots, over 14% of the industry may suffer from
or develop alcoholism. Ross & Ross, supra note 32, at 413.
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tion and Motivation Study (HIMS), formulated by the Air
Line Pilots Association (ALPA), in 1973.7 Approximately
1200 pilots have received treatment in that program. 8
Dr. Joseph A. Pursch, a founder of the rehabilitation ef-
fort, expressed his legitimate fear that "[f]or every pilot I
treat, there are five more who just sneak into early retire-
ment."' 39 The number of pilots utilizing HIMS constantly
reminds industry and government officials that the com-
mercial airline community is not immune from the threat
of intoxicated employees. Consequently, many officials
maintain a desire to err on the side of caution by further
restricting pilots' behavior before, during, and after flight.
4. Driving- While-Intoxicated Information
Recently, advocates of stricter controls pointed to the
number of pilots who have driving-while-intoxicated of-
fenses on their records as evidence of the growing prob-
lem of alcohol abuse. In 1987, the FAA cross-checked
pilot records with the National Driver Registry.40 The Ad-
ministration found that 10,300 active pilots had their
driver's licenses suspended or revoked for drunk driv-
ing.4 ' Although the majority of those pilots flew small,
non-commercial airplanes, more than 1000 were commer-
cial airline pilots who flew passenger planes.4 2 If a DWI
offense indicates that an individual suffers from an alcohol
problem, then the DOT has a staggering new statistic with
which to justify tightening the reigns on airline pilots.
37 Martinez, supra note 36, at ii. "The heart of the HIMS program is that once a
pilot is identified, a trained team of union pilots, company officials, physicians and
FAA officials work together to get the pilot off the line, into rehabilitation and
eventually, back into the cockpit." Id. Identification may be made by anyone who
is in an appropriate position to detect a drinking pilot, and the pilot need not fear
automatic discharge. Id.
" Weiner, Drunken Flying. supra note 25, at 6. FAA Chief Psychiatrist, Dr. Bur-
ton Pakull, estimated that in the program's 15 year history, around 1200 pilots
have received treatment. Id.
39 Id.
40 Weiner, Rules on Drinking, supra note 11, at 24.
41 Id. See also 136 CONG. REC. S3,127-28 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 1990) (statement of
Sen. Danforth).
42 Weiner, Rules on Drinking, supra note 11, at 24.
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B. ALCOHOL'S EFFECTS ON PILOTS
Unlike the inconclusive nature of the statistics regard-
ing the extent of alcohol abuse by pilots, pervasive, defini-
tive evidence confirms the danger of mixing alcohol with
the cockpit. Researchers continue to extensively evaluate
the effects of alcohol on specific piloting tasks. Undoubt-
edly, performance can be impaired even at relatively low
blood alcohol concentrations 43 or when the pilot flies with
a hang-over.44
1. Dangers Involved in Flying While Intoxicated
Drinking hinders an individual's ability to operate a car
safely, and piloting an airplane challenges an individual's
motor coordination and mental responses to a much
greater extent than does operating an automobile.45 Pi-
lots find flying an aircraft more difficult than driving an
automobile because of the "complex coordination re-
quirements and multiplicity of tasks, such as maintaining
course headings and level flight, monitoring power set-
tings and fuel reserves, and communicating with air traffic
control. "46
Alcohol depresses the central nervous system, and peo-
ple vary in their susceptibility to the accompanying ef-
fects. For the intolerant, a BAC as low as .025 percent
hampers judgment and leads to the impairment of "re-
cently learned, complex, and finely tuned skills." 4 7 A
moderate dose harms almost all aspects of information
processing. 48 Additionally, alcohol, even in minimal
doses in the most tolerant drinker, negatively affects an
43 For a discussion of the detrimental effects of minimal doses of alcohol, see
infra notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
44 For a discussion of the hang-over effect, see infra notes 55-65 and accompa-
nying text.
45 FAA REQUIREMENTS NEEDED, supra note 20, at 5.
46 Id.
47 Modell & Mountz, supra note 20, at 456.
4" Id. Persons lose the ability to utilize a large number of situational cues
presented at once. They also lose the cognitive ability to interpret the meaning of
incoming information. Id.
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individual's vision.49 The net result is that the pilot's abil-
ity to perceive the airplane's actual attitude is decreased,
as is the pilot's tracking ability.50 The pilot loses the skills
necessary to maintain control of the aircraft, read instru-
ments and navigational charts, and see and avoid other air
traffic.5 1
Ability diminishes as the amount of alcohol increases.
At a BAC level of .12% the amount of major procedural
errors triples.5 2  A complete loss of aircraft control be-
comes a significant threat. Furthermore, higher altitudes
accentuate alcohol's affect on the complex skills necessary
to operate the airplane.53 The physiological effects are
twice as great at 10,000 feet above sea level and three
times as great at 15,000 feet above sea level. 54
2. Danger of Flying While Hung-Over
Perhaps more surprising, alcohol impairs a pilot's abil-
ity to fly many hours after consumption even when the pilot's
BAC is near or at zero. 55 Studies revealed the existence of
this "hang-over effect" over twelve years ago. 56 Research-
ers and commercial airlines agree that the FAA-mandated
eight hour interval between drinking and flying, the bottle
49 See FED. AVIATION ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP. REPORT FAA-AM 78-2,
EFFECTS OF ETHANOL ON VISUAL UNIT ACTIVITY IN THE THALAMUS 1, 6 (1978) (pre-
pared by A. M. Revzin).
50 See Modell & Mountz, supra note 20, at 456. See also FED. AVIATION ADMIN.,
U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., REPORT FAA-AM-79-7, LABORATORY PERFORMANCE DUR-
ING ACUTE INTOXICATION AND HANGOVER 1, 22 (1979) (prepared by William E.
Collins and W. Dean Chiles) [hereinafter ACUTE INTOXICATION AND HANGOVER].
5' Modell & Mountz, supra note 20, at 456.
52 Id. "Blood alcohol concentrations of [0.05 to 0.12 percent] produce progres-
sively larger and more consistent decrements in all.., performance measures and
in oculovestibular functions, again with pronounced detrimental effects during ac-
tual flight conditions involving acceleration and in some cases dim lighting." Id.
at 457.
13 FAA REQUIREMENTS NEEDED, supra note 20, at 16.
. Id.
15 Modell & Mountz, supra note 20, at 456. See FED. AVIATION ADMIN., U.S.
DEP'T OF TRANSP., REPORT FAA-AM-79-9, EFFECTS OF CONGNER AND NON-
CONGNER ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES ON A CLINICAL ATAXIA TEST BATTERY 1 (1979)
(prepared by DavidJ. Schroeder and William E. Collins). But see ACUTE INTOXICA-
TION AND HANGOVER, supra note 50, at 1, 23.
- FAA REQUIREMENTS NEEDED, supra note 20, at 15.
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to throttle rule, does not adequately protect pilots and
their passengers.
A report to the 1981 Aerospace Medical Association
confirmed what the rest of the scientific community sus-
pected. Researchers revealed that the federally required
eight hour period can be insufficient to prevent threaten-
ing visual disorientation.58 The report indicated that alco-
hol can remain in the ear canals as many as twelve hours
after consumption, thus leading to "rapid, jerky oscilla-
tions of the eyeballs and related sensations of angular
movement during flight."' 59 Moreover, in 1986, research-
ers conducted a study which found severe impairment as
many as fourteen hours after the pilots drank enough to
become legally intoxicated. 60 They concluded that a pilot
may not possess the "ability to perform critical flying ma-
neuvers" fourteen hours later, though they found little or
no traces of alcohol in the pilots' bloodstream. 6' Appar-
ently, alcohol debilitates the "working" memory. The pi-
lot can neither divide his attention between the several
tasks he must perform nor perform non-routine tasks as
effectively.62 Of course, the results decrease the pilot's
ability to properly handle routine and emergency flight
needs.
The study also tested pilots' subjective awareness of the
effects that alcohol may have after many hours of drink-
ing. Pilots generally did not acknowledge that any nega-
57 Id.
58 Between Bottle and Blue Yonder, Sci. NEWS, July 18, 1981, at 47. K.E. Money
and other researchers from the Defense and Civil Institute of Environmental
Medicine in Ontario studied the effects of rapid ingestion of alcohol and pro-
longed consumption. Subjects in both study groups experienced visual disorien-
tation more than eight hours after drinking. In some instances, the disorientation
continued even after 11 hours. Id.
59 Id.
- Airborne and Hung Over, Sci. NEWS, Dec. 20-27, 1986, at 398. Jerome A.
Yesavage and Von Otto Leirer of Stanford University's School of Medicine stud-
ied the lasting effects of alcohol consumption on ten Navy pilots. Id. Pilots per-
formed poorly in the hang-over condition on tasks including control of the
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tive effects remained for more than a very short period of
time.63 In fact, those surveyed believed it was safe to fly
after only four hours had passed.64 Pilots typically under-
estimated the importance of the bottle to throttle rule. A
United Airline pilot commented that although he refrains
from drinking twenty-four hours before a flight due to al-
cohol's effects, "[t]here are pilots out there who will drink
heavily right up to the limit." 65
III. EVALUATION OF CURRENT FEDERAL
REGULATIONS
Members of the public and the government agree that
since alcohol has a highly detrimental effect on cockpit
performance, stringent government regulations must con-
trol the relationship between pilots and alcohol. 66 Be-
cause great potential for tragedy exists, advocates of strict
adherence to the rules discount the inconclusive statistical
evidence of the number of pilots with drinking problems.
The federal rules are primarily codified in the Federal
Aviation Regulations and the Federal Aviation Act,
though additional penalties appear in other United States
Code provisions. State law and commercial airline poli-
cies also regulate the use of alcohol by pilots. Many of
those regulations are more stringent than those of the
federal government. The Appendix contains a listing of
state flying-while-intoxicated statutes.
During the seventies and early eighties, the FAA initi-
ated a policy intended to prevent abuse (practice deter-
rence) rather than to punish those who over-indulge.67
Recent rules promulgated by the FAA and Congress sug-
63 Bottle to Throttle, Sci. AM., Feb. 1987, at 86. Since no trace of alcohol existed
in the pilots' bloodstreams, those pilots simply concluded that alcohol from the
previous drinking episode lost all of its physiological influence. Id.
4 Id.
65 Weiner, Rules on Drinking, supra note 11, at 24.
- See, e.g., Airline and Rail Service Protection Act: Hearing on S. 356 and S. 362 Before
the Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 106
(1987); Dealing with Drugs, supra note 19, at 1-3 (outlining the severity of alcohol
abuse in the transportation community).
67 See generally FAA REQUIREMENTS NEEDED, supra note 20, at 18.
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gest a fundamental shift in the government's attitude.
Specifically, alcohol-related legislation controls the
amount of time between drinking and flying, the permissi-
ble BAC at the time of flight, the prerequisites for medical
certification, and the availability of non-flight related evi-
dence of alcohol problems. Both civil and criminal penal-
ties exist to punish the pilot who breaks the rules. These
rules affect approximately 752,000 individuals who pres-
ently hold FAA-issued "medical certificates in conjunction
with student, private, commercial, airline transport,
glider-only, and lighter-than-air pilot certificates and
ratings.' '68
A. FAR SECTION 91.1 7 (A)
The FAA amended section 91.17 of the FAR's in 1985
and 1986.69 This regulation applies to all civil pilots, in-
cluding general and commercial aviators. Subsection
(a)(1), the bottle to throttle rule, restricts the number of
hours before flight that a pilot can drink to eight.70 The
FAA proposed the rule in 1966, and it eventually became
law in 1970 after a face-off between the FAA and aviation
special interest groups who opposed the standard. 7' Con-
troversy surrounds the section in light of persuasive evi-
' Dan Cook, Aviation Groups Voice Negative Reaction to FAA Rule Mandating Report-
ing of Highway Drug, Alcohol Actions, AIR SArETY WK., Aug. 6, 1990, at 1, 3.
69 14 C.F.R. § 91.17 (1990). The regulation provides:
(a) No person may act or attempt to act as a crewmember of a civil
aircraft -
(1) Within 8 hours after the consumption of any alcoholic bever-
age;
(2) While under the influence of alcohol;
(3) While using any drug that affects the person's faculties in any
way contrary to safety; or




1' FAA REQUIREMENTS NEEDED, supra note 20, at 14-15. InJanuary 1970, a ma-
jor interest group changed its position to actively support the eight hour regula-
tion because such a rule would enhance safety by educating pilots about alcohol
abuse, deterring over-consumption, and by improving enforcement. Id. at 15.
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dence of the hang-over effect.72 Critics maintain the rule
is far too lenient. Most major airlines agree and there-
fore prohibit drinking twelve to twenty-four hours before
flying. 7" The section seems "implicitly to permit aircraft
operation eight hours after a period of heavy to moder-
ately heavy drinking. 74
Subsections (a)(2) and (a)(3) of the regulation are con-
troversial because of their subjective nature. Section
(a)(2) prohibits crewmembers from flying if they are
under the influence of alcohol, and section (a) (3) prevents
crewmembers from flying if they have used a drug that
could impair their abilities to operate the aircraft safely.
Since pilots report they are unaware of the effects of alco-
hol,75 compliance with the rule is probably minimal.76 To
those pilots who fully appreciate the damage that alcohol
inflicts upon the central nervous system and eyesight,
these sections prohibit flying even with a BAC under
0.04% or within a period of eight hours after drinking. 77
Only this interpretation achieves the FAA's goal of pro-
moting safe drinking habits among pilots.
Finally, subsection (a)(4) forbids pilots from operating
an aircraft while having a BAC of 0.04% or more.78 The
rationale for the 0.04% rule rests on the fact that a pilot
could comply with the eight hour rule yet still have a high
level of alcohol in the blood. 79 This rule is perhaps the
most controversial provision of FAR section 91.17 as it
reflects the recent efforts by the FAA to crack down on
72 For a discussion of the hang-over effect, see supra part II. B.2. and accompa-
nying text.
73 Weiner, Rules on Drinking, supra note 11, at 24.
74 Modell & Mountz, supra note 20, at 458.
75 See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
76 Modell & Mountz, supra note 20, at 458.
77 Id.
78 The FAA began considering adoption of minimum BAC levels in 1965. FAA
REQUIREMENTS NEEDED, supra note 20, at 14. It settled for the eight hour rule
because powerful interest groups adamantly opposed the more stringent regula-
tions. Id. at 14-15. The rule was again recommended in 1978; the DOT agreed
that a blood alcohol standard was necessary and drafted a proposal. Id. at 18.
19 Ross & Ross, supra note 32, at 414.
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alcohol use by pilots. 80
The Administration believes that the (a)(4) provision
supplements the eight hour rule and ensures safer air
travel. While violation of the eight hour rule is difficult to
prove without either a confession or eyewitness testi-
mony, a variety of tests readily identify a pilot who is fly-
ing with an illegal amount of alcohol in his system.8"
Establishing the legal limit at higher than zero, however,
indicates to pilots that flying with a BAC of 0.04% is per-
fectly safe. 2 Since the effects of even a minimal dose of
alcohol hamper pilot performance, this message actually
endangers travelers while attempting to protect them.8
An additional concern is that pilots will follow the BAC
rule in lieu of a rule of abstinence. 4
1. Recommendations
Researchers recommend several revisions of section
91.17.85 Dr. Jack G. Modell and Dr. James M. Mountz,
both of the University of Michigan, suggest that the per-
missible BAC level found in subsection (a)(4) should be
reduced.8 6 While they ideally would like to see a permissi-
ble BAC of zero, they recognize that such a change is un-
likely. Modell and Mountz therefore recommend
lowering the level to "no more than 0.01 percent alcohol
per volume of blood. ' ' 88 The 0.0 1% proposition allows
for minor errors in testing procedures and devices, while
permitting only a trace of alcohol in the bloodstream. 89
Still, Dr. Susan M. Ross and Dr. Leonard E. Ross, both
80 Proponents of the BAC rule complain that most states' driving-while-intoxi-
cated legislation is stricter than the federal aviation limit. Weiner, Rules on Drink-
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of the University of Wisconsin-Madison, argue for a zero
blood-alcohol level. 90 Based on their results of pilot
surveys, Ross and Ross concluded that pilots have rela-
tively conservative attitudes about drinking, and they fur-
ther contend that the aviation community would support a
change to lower the minimum allowable BAC.9 '
Both research teams agree that the eight hour rule must
be lengthened to at least twelve hours.92 Modell and
Mountz also suggest expressly forbidding all pilots from
flying within twenty-four hours after consumption of five
or more "standard alcoholic drinks"' 93 or if any after-ef-
fects of consumption, including a hang-over, persist.94
Since many airlines already insist on a minimal wait ex-
ceeding eight hours, a federally mandated extension likely
would not provoke controversy in the commercial airline
industry.95 Although many airlines voluntarily require
their pilots to wait longer than eight hours after drinking
before flying, only the federal limit controls general avia-
tors. Thus, federally mandating the change would reach
far beyond the aviation industry. Since statistics indicate
that general aviation tends to experience a greater
number of alcohol-related accidents, the extension to a
twelve hour rule could potentially decrease that
number.9 6
Additionally, the regulation could begin with a pream-
ble urging the importance of following the mandated
N Ross and Ross, supra note 33, at 414.
91 Id.
92 Modell & Mountz, supra note 20, at 459; Ross & Ross, supra note 32, at 413.
Modell and Mountz point out that "compliance may decrease as the required in-
terval between drinking and flying is extended. Nevertheless, to prevent further
misconceptions about the advisability of flying during a specific period after mod-
erate or heavy drinking, we recommend this 'bottle-to-throttle' rule be increased
.... Modell & Mountz, supra note 20, at 459.
9 Modell & Mountz, supra note 20, at 456. A standard drink contains approxi-
mately 15 grams of alcohol. Typically, 1.5 oz. of distilled liquor (80 proof), 12 oz.
of beer, or 5 oz. of wine constitute a standard drink. Id.
94 Id. at 459.
91 See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
96 For a discussion of the number of accidents caused by alcohol in general
aviation, see supra notes 20-25 and accompanying text.
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rules by conveying the consequences of a violation in lay-
man's terms. The message would then reach not only the
professional pilot who must follow stringent company
policies, but it would also reach the general aviator.97 Ac-
cording to Modell and Mountz, the preamble should ex-
pressly point out the following facts: a pilot's performance
can be impaired enough to threaten air safety after drink-
ing only one alcoholic beverage a couple of hours before
take-off;98 impairment can last for as long as twenty-four
hours after consuming five standard alcoholic drinks;99
for each alcoholic beverage consumed, two or more hours
are required to metabolize it to the point where the alco-
hol will be undetectable; 00 and a pilot's judgment be-
comes impaired as an effect of alcohol, thus decreasing
the pilot's ability to adequately assess his own competence
to fly an aircraft.' 0 ' Regularly testing pilots about specific
alcohol regulations and the effects of alcohol could fur-
ther deter irresponsible drinking behavior. 10 2
2. Problems with Proposed Revisions
The proposed revisions fail to solve significant
problems with the regulations. Those drafting new rules
must recognize the limited possibility of enforcement in
the general aviation community. While commercial pilots
experience constant review by their employers, thus de-
terring substance abuse, no such impetus exists in the
general aviation context. Reliance on self-enforcement
97 Modell & Mountz, supra note 20, at 459. Testing a pilot about the contents of
such a preamble would increase the likelihood that a pilot would actually read it.
98 Id.
99 Id.
-0o Id. For instance, the preamble proposed by Modell and Mountz would state
that "the metabolism and elimination of 2100 ml (72 oz) of beer, 890 ml (30 oz) of
wine, or 270 ml (9 oz) of distilled liquor may take at least 12 hours to reduce the
[BAC] to below the maximal permissible level of 0.01 percent ... for piloting an
aircraft." Id.
01 Id.
102 Id. Modell and Mountz contend that pilots should be tested regarding the
short-term and long-term effects of alcohol on flight performance in conjunction
with all licensing examinations. Id.
95319921
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provides only minimal assurance of compliance if the pilot
suffers from alcoholism. Without additional external en-
forcement mechanisms, success in combatting alcohol
abuse in the field of general aviation is unlikely. Cur-
rently, an air traffic controller does not possess the federal
authority to detain or arrest a general aviator whom he
believes to be intoxicated. While a controller may at-
tempt to convince the pilot not to fly, in order to protect
the public, the FAA must vest all controllers with the lim-
ited authority to prevent suspect flights until the arrival of
a flight inspector.
Furthermore, the revisionists emphasize that pilots
must better appreciate the consequences of flying under
the influence. The suggestion that pilots undergo a more
extensive examination on the subject warrants serious
consideration. The FAA should recognize, however, that
a pilot may simply memorize the information for the lim-
ited purpose of receiving his license. Once he obtains
that license, the importance of the data may decrease.
Consequently, additional educational programming
should be mandated throughout the commercial industry
and the general aviation community. Additional sessions
could underscore the importance of the information, and
at the very least, would refresh the pilot's memory.
B. FAR SECTION 91.1 7 (c),(E)
The FAA also requires a pilot to submit to alcohol test-
ing performed by law enforcement officials when prob-
able cause exists to believe that the pilot has violated
section 91.17(a).10 3 The information acquired through
103 14 C.F.R. § 91.17 (1991). The Administration requires:
(c) A crewmember shall do the following:
(1) On request of a law enforcement officer, submit to a test to
indicate the percentage by weight of alcohol in the blood, when-
(i) The law enforcement officer is authorized under State or
local law to conduct the test or to have the test conducted; and
(ii) The law enforcement officer is requesting submission to
the test to investigate a suspected violation of State or local law gov-
erning the same or substantially similar conduct prohibited by para-
graph (a)(l), (a)(2), or (a)(4) of this section ....
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such a test may be used against the offender in a civil ac-
tion for revocation or suspension of the pilot's license or
in criminal proceedings.'0 4 This regulation does not
grant the federal government the authority to impose ran-
dom alcohol testing'0 5 before flight or following an acci-
dent.' Pursuant to section (c), however, a pilot must
submit to testing by local law enforcement officials if state
or local law so requires. 0 7  Forty-four states currently
mandate that a pilot submit to an alcohol test. The catch-
all clause in the federal regulation grants the FAA access
to the results of any alcohol test that is performed within
four hours of an accident.10 8
(e) Any test information obtained by the Administrator... may be
evaluated in determining a person's qualifications for any airman
certificate or possible violations of this chapter and may be used as
evidence in any legal proceeding under section 602, 609, or 901 of
the Federal Aviation Act of 1958.
Id.
10 14 C.F.R. § 91.17(e) (1991). Pilots may also be prosecuted for violating the
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986. See 18 U.S.C. § 342 (1988) (forbidding operation
of a common carrier while intoxicated).
105 For a discussion of the move for random alcohol testing, see infra notes 203-
213 and accompanying text.
06 In December 1989, the FAA gained authority to conduct urinalysis screen-
ing for five drugs after any accident. The Administration cannot require alcohol
testing under that rule. Delta ALPA Central Air Safety Comm., FAA Required Drug
Testing, THE SAFETY MIND, 3d Q. 1990, at 14. Additionally, the NTSB cannot re-
quire submission to an alcohol test; such a test, however, is available as part of an
accident investigation on a purely voluntary basis. Delta ALPA Central Air Safety
Comm., Voluntary NTSB v. FAA Required Drug Testing, THE SAFETY MIND, 3d Q.
1990, at 15 [hereinafter Voluntary Testing].
107 14 C.F.R. § 91.17(c) (1991).
l08 14 C.F.R. § 91.17(d) (1991). The Administrator has access to results of tests
performed by local officials when there is a reasonable belief that the pilot was
intoxicated. The section provides:
(d) Whenever the Administrator has a reasonable basis to believe
that a person may have violated paragraph (a)(l), (a)(2), or (a)(4) of
this section, that person shall . . . furnish the Administrator, or au-
thorize any clinic, hospital, doctor, or other person to release-to the
Administrator, the results of each test taken within 4 hours after act-
ing or attempting to act as a crewmember that indicates the presence
of any drugs in the body.
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C. ANTI-DRUG ABUSE ACTS OF 1986 AND 1988
The Anti-Drug Abuse Acts of 1986109 and 1988110 pro-
hibit an individual from operating a common carrier
under the influence of alcohol. Section 343 establishes
that a blood alcohol level of .10% or more creates a pre-
sumption that an individual is under the influence."'
Aviators and their lawyers complain that beyond section
343, there is "no satisfactory guidance for determining
impairment."' ' 2 In addition, there is no case law on
which to rely." 13
Constitutional problems exist with the presumptive na-
ture of section 343. Unlike most state DWI laws, which
make it illegal to drive a motor vehicle with a BAC higher
than .10%, section 343 shifts the burden of proof from
the government and places it on the defendant. 1 4 Be-
cause similar provisions have been ruled unconstitutional
by the courts, a prosecutor may be left trying to prove im-
pairment without reliance on the .10% of the Fargo inci-
dent.' 15 Such was the case in the Northwest Airlines
litigation that arose out of the Fargo incident." 6
Because of the question of constitutionality, the United
States attorney who pursued the conviction of the North-
west flight crew" 7 ignored the presumptive .10% BAC
provision."t 8 She instead chose to argue that the
log 18 U.S.C. § 342 (1988).
1lo 18 U.S.C. § 343 (1988).
11 Id. The section states that "an individual with a blood alcohol level of .10
percent or more shall be presumed to be under the influence of alcohol." Id.
2 Government Tries for Jury Finding of Impairment in Trial of Three Pilots who Drank
Before Flight, AIR SAFETY WK., Aug. 13, 1990, at 1 [hereinafter July Finding].
113 Id.
4 Id. Peter Wold, attorney for Captain Norman Prouse in the Northwest litiga-
tion which arose out of the Fargo incident, stated: "The mandatory presumptive
inference [of the law] is on its face unconstitutional. It is quite different from
language in state motor vehicle laws which state that it is against the law to drive
with a blood alcohol level above a certain percentage." Id. at 2.
15 Id. at 1-2.
116 Id.
117 See supra notes 1-16 and accompanying text for discussion of the Northwest
incident.
118 See Jury Finding, supra note 112, at 2.
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crewmembers were "under the influence of alcohol, thus
impaired, at the time they flew."'1 9 While the jury be-
lieved her contention that the pilots' mental capacities
and motor abilities were impaired, the United States at-
torney commented that the case was difficult to prove
based on the law. 12 0 Litigation of the Northwest case un-
derscores the inefficacy of current maximum allowable
BAC levels found in the Code and the FARs. Both the
prosecutor and a crewmember's defense attorney agreed
that Congress must incorporate a much lower maximum
limit into its laws.' 2'
D. MEDICAL CERTIFICATION STANDARDS
Prior to legally flying an aircraft, an individual must ob-
tain a pilot's license. Before an individual can acquire that
license, he must comply with a number of medical re-
quirements and receive an actual medical certificate.
Medical certification standards appear in the FARs.12 2
Clinical diagnosis or a proven medical history of alco-
holism12 3 automatically disqualifies an individual from sat-
isfying the medical certification standards. 124  The
Administration reluctantly allows the Federal Air Surgeon
to exempt an individual from the rule if he can establish





122 14 C.F.R. §§ 67.1-.31 (1991).
123 "Alcoholism" means something more than over-consumption. It refers to a
"pattern of use in which a person's intake of alcohol has been great enough to
damage his physical health or personal or social functioning or where the individ-
ual has become dependent upon alcohol." J. Scott Hamilton, Medical Certification
of Flight Crews: Standards and Procedures, 13 TRANSP. L.J. 103, 110 n.57 (1983) (cita-
tion omitted).
124 14 C.F.R. §§ 67.13(d)(1)(i)(c), 67.15(d)(1)(i)(c), and 67.17(d)(1)(i)(c)
(1991).
125 Id. The FAA amended its complete disqualification rule to bring the regula-
tion in accord with the Comprehensive Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism Preven-
tion, Treatment and Rehabilitation Act of 1970. 42 U.S.C. § 4561(c)(1)(1988).
The Act prevents the denial of employment or professional or other licenses
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The established procedure incorporates a system of
checks which ensures that pilots with medical problems
do not slip by the examiner. For example, airline trans-
port pilots face re-certification every six months. 126 Con-
sequently, an alcoholic pilot who manages to get through
the system once must face the same hurdle repeatedly.
While a pilot who fears that a legitimate, truthful response
could jeopardize his career might be motivated to under-
state, omit, or even lie when answering the questions on
the application form, stiff penalties should deter such in-
dividuals from falsifying information on their original and
subsequent applications. 2 7  Pursuant to the FAR's, a
fraudulent response leads to suspension or revocation of
any certificates held by the individual. 28  Moreover,
under the criminal code, felony conviction is possible. 29
E. AVAILABILITY OF DRIVER REGISTER INFORMATION
The National Driver Register (NDR or Register), main-
tained by the DOT, accumulates the names of individuals
whose driver's license or application for a driver's license
has been denied, suspended or revoked due to intoxica-
tion or other traffic offenses. 30 As early as the mid-seven-
ties, a General Accounting Office (GAO) report urged
Congress to open the Register to the FAA to assist in its
based solely on evidence of previous alcohol abuse. Id. See also Jensen v. Admin-
istrator, 641 F.2d 797 (9th Cir. 1981).
126 Hamilton, supra note 123, at 125.
127 Id.
128 14 C.F.R. § 67.20(b) (1991).
129 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988). According to the Federal Criminal Code:
Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or
agency of the United States knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals
or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact, or makes
any false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or representations, or
makes or uses any false writing or document, knowing the same to
contain any false, fictitious or fraudulent statement, shall be fined
not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or
both.
Id.
13o FAA REQUIREMENTS NEEDED, supra note 20, at ii, 8.
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certification and licensing functions.'"' On August 1,
1990, the FAA published its version of the rule, which be-
came effective November 29, 1990.132
The rule permits the FAA to deny a medical certificate
and suspend or revoke a pilot's license if the individual
has had two or more alcohol-related convictions or state
motor vehicle administrative actions within a three year
period. 3 3  Pilots involved in any drug or alcohol-related
driving incident must report the action to the Civil Avia-
tion Security Division of the FAA within sixty days of its
occurrence. 3 4 The Administration added an express con-
13, Id. The GAO entitled the 1976 report "The Federal Aviation Administra-
tion Should Do More to Detect Civilian Pilots Having Medical Problems." Id.
1-2 14 C.F.R. §§ 61.15, 67.3 (1991).
'3s 14 C.F.R. § 61.15 (1991). The new section requires:
(c) For the purposes of paragraphs (d) and (e) of this section, a mo-
tor vehicle action means-
(1) A conviction after November 29, 1990, for the violation of any
Federal or state statute relating to the operation of a motor vehicle
while intoxicated by alcohol or a drug, while impaired by alcohol or
a drug, or while under the influence of alcohol or a drug;
(2) The cancellation, suspension, or revocation of a license to op-
erate a motor vehicle by a state after November 29, 1990 for a cause
related to the operation of a motor vehicle while intoxicated ....
(3) The denial after November 29, 1990, of an application for li-
cense to operate a motor vehicle by a state for a cause related to the
operation of a motor vehicle while intoxicated .... (d) [A] motor
vehicle action occurring within 3 years of previous motor vehicle ac-
tion is grounds for-
(1) Denial of an application for any certificate or rating issued
under this part for a period of up to 1 year after the date of the last
motor vehicle action; or
(2) Suspension or revocation of any certificate or rating issued
under this part.Id.
34 Id. The regulations also state:
(e) Each person holding a certificate issued under this part shall pro-
vide a written report of each motor vehicle action to [the] Civil Avia-
tion Security Division . . . not later than 60 days after the motor
vehicle action ....
(f) Failure to comply with paragraph (e) of this section is grounds for
(1) Denial of an application for any certificate or rating issued
under this part for a period of up to 1 year after the date of the
motor vehicle action; or
(2) Suspension or revocation of any certificate or rating issued
under this part.
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sent clause to the medical certification requirements
which authorizes the FAA's access to the personal infor-
mation found in the NDR. 135 A revised "Application for
Airman Medical Certificate" accompanies the new regula-
tions and clarifies the serious legal repercussions for in-
tentionally providing incorrect information. 3
6
The rule is particularly noteworthy in that it enlarges
the FAA's power by extending the Administration's au-
thority beyond basic " 'flight operations' and any legiti-
mate interest it has in insuring [a pilot's] physical fitness
to operate an aircraft."' 37 Prior to NDR access, the FAA
could deny a pilot an operating license because of prior
DWI offenses in only one limited situation: when the pilot
failed to disclose that fact on his medical certification
form.' 38  That approach eventually failed on constitu-
tional due process grounds in judicial proceedings. 13 9
The "convictions" questions on the original certification
form fell under the heading "medical history," and the
courts consistently ruled a pilot could reasonably infer
that such questions were immaterial with respect to ascer-
taining his medical fitness. 140 Consequently, the previous
method of regulation was deemed ineffective, motivating
Id.
14 C.F.R. § 67.3 (1991). The new provision reads:
At the time of application for a certificate issued under this part,
each person who applies for a medical certificate shall execute an
express consent form authorizing the Administrator ... to transmit
information contained in the National Driver Register about the per-
son to the Administrator. The Administrator shall make information
received from the National Driver Register, if any, available on re-
quest to the person for review and written comment.
Id.
136 Id. See Richard L. Masters, FAA's Rule on Drug- and Alcohol-Related Offenses, AIR
LINE PILOT, Nov. 1990 (Supp.), at xvi. Pilots could face up to six years in prison
and up to $350,000 in fines for falsifying information. Five Pilots Indicted for Failure
to Report Motor Violations, AIR SAFETY WK., Nov. 12, 1990, at 1 [hereinafter Five
Pilots].
M3 Alan Armstrong, FAA Decrees Driving Records Germane, LAWYER-PILOTS B.
Ass'N J., Fall 1990, at 28.
"s Id.
139 Id.
140 Id. at 28-29.
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the current and unambiguous NDR rule. 4 '
Various rules require an airline pilot to disclose
whether he has had any DWI's on his annual and semi-
annual medical forms.' 42 FAA Administrator James B.
Busey suggested that a "yes" answer would merely "lead
to a medical decision one way or the other."' 4  Answer-
ing "no" - if later proved false by checking the Register
- could lead to action against the pilot.'4 4 While Busey's
statement implied that the medical decision would be dis-
cretionary, members in the industry fear that, in reality,
the standard is strict: two DWI offenses within three years
disqualifies an individual from piloting an airplane. 45
The Administration began enforcing the new regulation
in November 1990.146 A federal grand jury in Pittsburgh
indicted several pilots for falsifying information on airman
medical certificate applications. 47 A cross check with in-
formation in the NDR brought to light the pilots'
misreporting. 4
1. FAA Justification
Since the regulation is a new addition to the rules, as-
sessment of its practical impact is not yet possible. Never-
theless, the FAA has placed its full weight behind the
rule's ability to target individuals who endanger air
141 Id. The FAA learned that it needed federally authorized access after the loss
of many cases prosecuted by the DOJ before Judge George C. Carr in Tampa,
Florida. Thus, it "has set about to 'legislate' future victories after learning from
the shortcomings of its previous regulations." Id. at 29.
142 Convicted Drunken Drivers May Lose Their Aviation Medical Certificates, AIR SAFETY
WK., Apr. 2, 1990, at 3.
143 Id.
144 Id. The action could feasibly include criminal penalties pursuant to 18
U.S.C. §§ 1001, 3571 (1990). For an elaboration on possible penalties, see supra
note 124.
145 But cf Five Pilots, supra note 136, at 1 ("A conviction doesn't automatically
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safety. 149 Administrator Busey applauded the latest regu-
lation by claiming "[it] gives us the tool we need to deal
with pilots who drink and drive. This kind of behavior in-
dicates an attitude that we believe is not compatible with
safe flying."' 150 The Administration maintains that access
to the Register enhances safety by removing pilots who
are unwilling or unable to comply with safety
regulations. ' 5 1
Government officials maintain that applicants simply
were not truthfully answering questions regarding alco-
19 Use of information in the Register may also help airline companies avoid
liability should an intoxicated pilot cause an accident. Senator J. James Exxon
raised the issue in the context of railroad executives' ignorance of their employ-
ees' driving records:
I asked the railroad executives... as to whether or not they did any
inquiry at all with regard to an engineer's public driving record. I
asked them whether or not such information is public.
It was quite obvious ... that none of these railroad executives fully
comprehended what I was asking them. They didn't know that infor-
mation was available to them.
I have checked and found that it is available to them if they want it.
However, they may have to pay for it. It is obvious to me, whether
it's a pilot or a railroad engineer, that if I were going to hire new
employees, one of the first things I would want to do is determine
what kind of record that individual has compiled. I would want to
know whether that individual had ever been arrested under the DWI
statutes of any state.
Evidently, that has not been done. I would suspect that sooner or
later some sharp trial attorney, in bringing about some kind of claim,
is going to ask on the witness stand of a top [airline] executive,
"before you hired this man, did you even bother to check what his
driver's record was"? [sic] If the answer comes back, "no, we didn't
bother with it," I would think that trial attorney would make a pretty
good case.
Airline and Rail Passenger Protection Act: Hearing Before the Comm. on Commerce, Science,
and Transportation, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 30-31 (1987) (testimony ofJ. James Ex-
xon, Senator).
150 FAA to Publish Rule Requiring Mandatory Reporting of Motor Vehicle Drug- and
Alcohol-Related Actions, AIR SAFETY WK., July 30, 1990, at 3 (quoting James Busey,
FAA Administrator).
15, Lloyd B. Ericsson, DWI/DWI Pilots, LAWYER-PILOTS B. Ass'N J., Summer
1990, at 17. The press release which accompanies the new access provision main-
tained that "the new regulations necessary to ensure aviation safety by removing
from navigable airspace pilots who demonstrate an unwillingness or inability to
comply with state or local drunk driving law." Id.
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hol-related offenses under prior regulations.152 They
tested the accuracy of responses to DWI questions in the
medical histories submitted by license applicants in one
state by comparing the answers provided by the appli-
cants to state motor vehicle records. Of these applicants,
seventy-two had prior DWI convictions. Sixty-nine of the
individuals failed to disclose their conviction(s) on the ap-
plication.15 3 More strikingly, in 1987, 10,300 pilots com-
mitted DWI offenses. Of those convicted, over 7,000
neglected to reveal a conviction to the FAA, and more
than 1,000 of those individuals flew commercial
aircraft. 154
The linchpin in the government's position is that by
identifying those pilots who have driven drunk, the FAA
will be able to screen out the "bad" pilots who have drink-
ing problems. By implication, the government contends
that two DWI's indicates an individual is an alcoholic. Yet
the FAA has not published data proving a correlation be-
tween individuals with a DWI offense and alcoholism, or a
correlation between a DWI offense and accidents or safety
violations by a pilot. In fact, the FAA responded that it
made no effort to hide the lack of evidence for its position
to the criticism launched by opponents of the system. In-
stead, it simply noted that some of those pilots killed in
general aviation accidents had a relatively high BAC. The
Administration idealistically concluded that even if the
rule saved only a few lives, its promulgation was
worthwhile. 155
152 FAA REQUIREMENTS NEEDED, supra note 20, at 6; Masters, supra note 21, at
xv.
153 FAA REQUIREMENTs NEEDED, supra note 20, at 6. Some individuals who
withheld information regarding their driving record had numerous offenses. For
example, one pilot who claimed he had no traffic convictions actually hadfive in a
two year period. By failing to disclose those convictions, the individual obtained a
medical certificate, and later, a license. Id. at 6-7.
The FAA could have obtained this information via state driving conviction
records, but the workload involved in contacting individual state motor vehicle
departments was too ominous. Use of the Register will allegedly decrease the
burden. Id. at 8.
-4 Weiner, Rules on Drinking, supra note 11, at 24.
15, Cook, supra note 68, at 2. The FAA specifically responded that it did not:
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2. Pilot Opposition
Members of the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA),' 56
the Allied Pilots Association (APA),' 57 and the Aircraft
Owners and Pilot Association (AOPA)' 58 lodge three pri-
mary complaints against FAA access to the NDR.' 5
9
While each group certainly supports the goal of an alco-
hol-free pilot and crew,' 60 they contend that the means
chosen by the FAA to achieve that goal interfere exces-
sively with the pilot's privacy expectations and rights.' 6 '
ALPA characterized the rule as "poorly conceived, unnec-
essarily invasive, and ... a reversion back to the discred-
ited punitive approach to substance abuse." 162
First, the unions complain that no correlation exists be-
tween drunk driving convictions and flying a plane while
intoxicated. 63 The FAA rationale which relies on a po-
tential for saving lives does not satisfy opponents of the
rule. Pilot groups and twenty-six commentators on the
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) insist that no
attempt to obscure the lack of evidence correlating alcohol- or drug-
related motor vehicle accidents with substance abuse-related acci-
dents or incidents while operating an aircraft.... The FAA notes,
however, that from 1978 to 1987, 6 percent of general aviation pi-
lots killed in aviation accidents had a blood-alcohol level of .04 or
more. During that same period, 11,213 people died in general avia-
tion accidents. If the rule were to result in the saving of a few lives,
the potential benefits would exceed its potential cost.
Id.
156 The ALPA represents approximately 39,000 professional pilots employed by
47 different airlines. Dealing with Drugs, supra note 19, at 61.
, The APA represents American Airlines pilots and its subsidiary carriers.
Cook, supra note 68, at 2.
158 The AOPA represents general aviation pilots. Id.
159 Armstrong, supra note 137, at 28. Alan Armstrong, Chairman of the NTSB
Bar Association Committee on Legislative and Regulatory Activity, criticized the
unions for being lackadaisical in their protests. He stated, "[riecognizing the avia-
tion community's reluctance to combat these abuses by the Agency, the rest of us
must learn to live with the regulations contained in the [NDR] Rule." Id.
60 Dave Garramone, Post Accident Drug and Alcohol Testing, THE SAFETY MIND, 3d
Q. 1990, at 14. "ALPA firmly supports a drug-free cockpit and drug-free lifestyle
for pilots." Id.
161 Cook, supra note 68, at 1.
162 Id.
163 Id. at 2.
KNOWING WHEN TO SAY WHEN
nexus exists between the actions of pilots on the ground
and their actions in the air.' 64 Members of the industry
explain that there are pilots who do drink heavily to whom
the rule against mixing alcohol and flight is "inviolate."' 165
In fact, even if the critics concede that DWI convictions
on the ground prove that the pilot has an alcohol prob-
lem, the proposition fails to indicate a connection with his
or her flight performance. 66 The pilots' groups also em-
phasize that "[t]he new rule ... misses ... the pilot who
falls off the curb while walking away from the tavern or
who gets quietly drunk at home. That behavior, while
equally showing the potential for an alcohol problem, is
not illegal."' 167 Should no actual correlation exist, little
reason appears to justify the expense of the new program
and the obvious invasion of privacy.
Second, the pilots' associations believe the express con-
sent provision extends beyond the scope of authority per-
mitted by NDR legislation. One commentator on the
NPRM called the FAA's express consent requirement "a
deliberate and knowing act of administrative extortion,"
void of statutory authority. 68 Most particularly, the avia-
tion community believes that it is inappropriate for the
FAA to refuse to issue a medical certificate simply because
a person will not provide the requisite consent. The FAA
concedes that access to the NDR via consent violates a pi-
lot's privacy, but it maintains the invasion is neither large
164 Id.
16- Ericsson, supra note 151, at 17.
166 Id.
167 Id. The Senate proposes to eliminate that problem through random drug
testing. For a discussion of random drug testing, see infra notes 200-211.
16 Cook, supra note 68, at 2. The FAA disagreed:
[Tihe statute granting the FAA authority to receive NDR informa-
tion tied the use of the information specifically to the medical certifi-
cation process. The statute provides that the information is to be
used "to verify information required to be reported to the Adminis-
trator by an airman applying for an airman medical certificate and to
evaluate whether the airman meets the minimum standards pre-
scribed by the Administrator to be issued an airman medical
certificate."
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nor unjustified.16 9
Third, the unions perceive the new rule as a dangerous
step back to the days when commercial carriers simply dis-
charged pilots with alcohol problems rather than offering
them rehabilitation. The ALPA position insists the
proper method to deal with aviation alcoholism is the
HIMS program. 70  The organization claims that the
FAA's previous attitude regarding alcohol use by pilots
encouraged individuals to disclose problems in order to
receive treatment in industry-supported programs, often
saving their careers and their lives. Now, however, the
group fears that the FAA has "returned to the ignorance
that brought us Prohibition."' 17' While the FAA at one
time declared that an alcoholic suffers from a medical con-
dition that can be treated, the Administration may have
disregarded its work in the medical field by announcing
that "the primary mission of the FAA is aviation safety
and the identification of associated safety problems."' 172
3. Rehabilitation Program Supplanted
FAA access to the National Driver Register may thwart
industry efforts to rehabilitate pilots with alcohol
problems."73 Ideally, the recent regulations could simply
provide information to the FAA. The Administration
could use its knowledge of possible alcoholism among
original applicants and pilots to conduct further investiga-
tion of the relevant medical history. Simultaneously, the
FAA could encourage entry into the HIMS program to the
extent necessary.
Instead, the FAA's current position ignores the medical
facet of alcoholism. Rather than providing the informa-
tion gained from the Register to the medical personnel
16 Id.
170 Id. at 1-2. For a discussion of the HIMS program, see supra notes 37-39,
161-68 and accompanying text.
171 Masters, supra note 136, at xv.
172 Id.
173 Id.
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who make decisions regarding the pilot's fitness and au-
thorize medical certification, the information now goes di-
rectly to the Civil Aviation Security Division (CASD). 174
The FAA "point[ed] out that medical examination ... af-
ter a DWI/DUI would yield little information in the hands
of aviation medical examiner physicians."'' 75 Thus, the
CASD, a group of non-physicians, must review medical
records of targeted pilots. FAA officials have failed to ex-
plain what they hope this review will accomplish or why a
layman will make a better determination of a pilot's medi-
cal condition than a doctor.' 76
The HIMS rehabilitation treatment programs enjoy a
success rate of over ninety percent. 177 Every major airline
provides and funds a program for its personnel.17 8 A pilot
who completes rehabilitation and passes a series of psy-
chiatric tests loses no benefits or seniority and may return
to work. 179 Close post-rehabilitation supervision of the
pilot by doctors, another pilot, a counselor, and an airline
executive motivates the individual to continue abstaining
and alleviates the fear that safety will be jeopardized
should a relapse occur. The supervision continues for
two years.18 0 The airline industry will have to battle to
maintain a high level of self-disclosure by pilots in light of
the FAA's new approach.
Perhaps the FAA's access to the NDR and the tougher
penalties focus not on commercial pilots but on general
aviators who do not have the built-in safety feature of an
entire company checking their behavior. The HIMS reha-
bilitation effort is an industry phenomenon; it does not
174 Id.
175 Id. at xvi.
176 Id.
177 Drunken Flying, supra note 25, at 6.
178 On average, rehabilitation costs an airline approximately $17,000 per per-
son. Id. For many years, Northwest Airlines was a conspicuous exception since it
refused to provide assistance to pilots with alcohol problems. The airline imple-
mented its treatment effort in 1988. Prior to providing rehabilitation, those pilots
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reach the weekend and evening pilot. Therefore, the FAA
may simply have chosen to deal with the problem across-
the-board, conceiving that every little bit helps. To that
extent, the industry, from executives to pilots, should
continue vigorously pursuing rehabilitation of pilots with
drinking problems. Forthcoming data from the Register
which reveal DWI offenses and possible alcohol abuse
may indicate that many more pilots will need rehabilita-
tion programs. At the same time, the FAA may prevent
those general aviators from flying after accumulating five
DWI convictions.
IV. PROPOSED FEDERAL REGULATION:
MANDATORY ALCOHOL TESTING
At the present time, no federal rule or other piece of
federal legislation requires alcohol testing of pilots with-
out cause to believe there is impairment. An examination
of current and potential regulations, as well as an assess-
ment of their benefits and shortcomings, follows.
A. NTSB VOLUNTARY POST-ACCIDENT DRUG AND
ALCOHOL TESTING
An NTSB policy initiated in July 1987 requests that any
pilot involved in an aviation accident submit to a drug or
alcohol test.' 8 ' Basically, the NTSB asks the pilot to pro-
vide a blood and urine sample on a purely voluntary ba-
sis.' 82 As the investigation progresses, the NTSB makes
the determination as to whether to proceed with lab anal-
ysis of the sample or to dispose of it.'83 Upon completion
of the lab work, the Board releases the results to the pub-
lic "in factual form."'8 4 Because the NTSB has not as-
sured the ALPA that it will use high quality lab standards
and other safeguarding procedures, the pilots' union ad-
1"' Delta ALPA Central Air Safety Comm., NTSB Drug and Alcohol Testing, THE
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vises pilots to refrain from providing any samples.' 8 5 If
proper quality control procedures are not used in assay-
ing samples, the results may be erroneous.
After a recent USAir incident in which an aircraft skid-
ded off the runway into water, the pilot disappeared for
more than fourteen hours before appearing for question-
ing by the FAA, NTSB or USAir officials. The pilot's dis-
appearance illustrates the inefficacy of the NTSB rule. 8 6
The policy simply provides no impetus for a pilot who
may have been under the influence to come forward; it
seems only to provide an avenue for a pilot who had not
been under the influence to clear himself of any impres-
sion that he may have been intoxicated.
B. FAA MANDATED DRUG TESTING
The FAA mandated drug testing in December 1989 for
commercial airline pilots and other safety-sensitive trans-
portation workers.' 8 7 The FAA regulation requires every
commercial carrier and self-employed commercial pilot to
file a plan providing for drug testing in six separate con-
texts: pre-employment, random, periodic, post-accident,
reasonable cause, and return to duty. 8 8 Ultimately, the
responsibility rests with employers to properly implement
the Administration's program. Unlike the NTSB's volun-
tary testing program, if a pilot receives a request to sub-
mit to an FAA-initiated drug test, he must comply. 8 9 The
FAA designed the rule to detect five specific drugs: mari-
juana, cocaine, PCP, opiates, and amphetamines. 90 The
185 Voluntary Testing, supra note 106 at 15. The ALPA's concern appears justi-
fied. The NTSB does not comply with guidelines for testing issued by the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services. Consequently, the union feels that "[u]ntil
these matters can be straightened out, it would be best to suggest declining the
opportunity to provide a sample to the NTSB." Id.
186 135 CONG. REC. S15,403-01 (daily ed. Nov. 9, 1989) (statement of Sen.
Danforth).
ll7 See FAA Required Drug Testing, supra note 106, at 14.
'8t See Alan Armstrong, Drug Testing is on the Way, LAWYER-PILOTS B. Ass'N J.,
Winter 1990, at 16.
11,9 Voluntary Testing, supra note 106, at 15.
'.,o Armstrong, supra note 188, at 17.
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rule, however, does not currently target alcohol. 9 '
While serious challenges to the FAA's testing and labo-
ratory procedures have not been lodged, the rule is not
without many shortcomings. 92 Initially, insofar as gen-
eral aviation drug abuse is concerned, the rule does not
apply. Interestingly, the FAA most often provides statis-
tics of general aviation accidents to emphasize the need
for more stringent alcohol control, and yet this particular
rule essentially overlooks that segment of the aviation
community.
Self-employed commercial pilots' 93 present another
problem with the FAA's rule. 94 Those individuals are
supposed to hire their own doctors to supervise the test-
ing. They are then supposed to surprise themselves with
unannounced drug tests and counsel themselves in the
event they discover they have a drug problem. 195 The in-
effectiveness of self-enforced testing is obvious. Both the
mechanics of the testing procedure and enforcement pro-
vide real questions as to this plan's practical application in
any arena outside of commercial carriers.
C. NPRM ISSUED ON ALCOHOL
The FAA's drug testing rule is noteworthy because the
Administration could amend the rule to include testing
for alcohol. Alternatively, the FAA could design a specific
alcohol testing regulation based upon the drug provi-
sions. The FAA currently limits testing for alcohol in pi-
lots to situations in which reasonable cause exists to
believe the pilot was intoxicated. 196  Indications suggest
19, Id.
192 Voluntary Testing, supra note 106, at 15. "The required FAA test is carried out
at a company supervised collection facility, shipped, and analyzed by a certified
lab." Id.
19- Self-employed commercial pilots include pilots who engage in flight instruc-
tion, sight seeing flights, ferrying or transporting aircraft, crop dusting, aerial
photography, pipe line and power line patrols, and any form of flight for compen-
sation. 14 C.F.R. § 135(a) (1991). See also Armstrong, supra note 188, at 16.
NA Armstrong, supra note 188, at 17.
195 Id.
I6 Modell & Mountz, supra note 20, at 459.
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that this limitation will change in the near future. 9 7 An
NPRM, issued by the DOT in December 1989, proposes
to include alcohol within the list of substances for which
the aviation community must test. 9 8 Sources in the Drug
Abatement Branch of the Administration claim that alco-
hol testing is now "inevitable."' 199
D. CONGRESSIONAL INITIATIVES
In the congressional arena, Senators John C. Danforth
and Ernest F. Hollings lead the crusade for an alcohol
testing program. 200 For the past five years, both senators
have pushed legislation mandating four forms of alcohol
testing: random, post-accident, periodic, and pre-employ-
ment.20 ' The Senate passed such legislation nine
times.202 The House of Representatives, however, has re-
fused to put its stamp of approval on any legislation re-
quiring alcohol testing.20 3  The legislation has again
passed through the Senate and currently sits before the
House Public Works Committee. 0 4 In the aftermath of
the Fargo incident, the bills have gained momentum in
the House.2 °5
In response to criticism in the Senate, the House pro-
197 See Armstrong, supra note 188, at 17.
198 Id.
199 Id.
200 Senator Hollings urged the Congress that "we cannot leave the fate of these
important regulations to the whim of some DOT official. The only way to ensure
the safety of the travelling public is to mandate legislatively ... random drug and
alcohol testing .... 135 CONG. REC. S15,403-01 (daily ed. Nov. 9, 1989) (state-
ment of Sen. Hollings).
201 136 CONG. REC. S3,127-28 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 1990) (statement of Sen.
Danforth).
202 Id.
20 Id. Senator Danforth complained:
[T]he Senate went into conference with the House on three separate
bills containing drug and alcohol testing provisions. We were un-
able to reach agreement on drug and alcohol testing because the two
House committees with responsibility for rail, aviation, and motor
safety once again refuse to deal with us on the subject.
ld.
Id4 Weiner, Rules on Drinking, supra note 11, at 24.
205 Id.
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posed legislation that would commit federal funding to
research programs designed to determine and detect the
"safe" level of alcohol in aviators and the pervasiveness of
alcoholism in the aviation industry. 6 The House bill
does not contain a testing provision. Two possible inter-
pretations of the House's recent action exist. Initially,
one might conclude that the House is making genuine
progress with regard to the need for legislation dealing
with alcohol use by pilots which could eventually result in
adoption of testing requirements. On the other hand, the
House may simply be forestalling public and Senate pres-
sure by taking a mere symbolic action. While the House's
efforts appear progressive, the real intention may be to tie
up productive action in the red tape of inconclusive re-
search. Ultimately, even assuming the House fosters posi-
tive intentions, the result of this legislation might still be
frustrated with problems of data collection and analysis.
The proposed Senate bills would provide for testing for
the use of alcohol by the operators of aircraft and for
other purposes. 20 7  Specifically, the Danforth-Hollings
proposals require airline companies to conduct pre-em-
ployment testing of pilots and crewmen, periodic testing
during their employment tenure, random testing, and
post-accident testing.208 Pilots would be subjected to
20 H.R. 4848, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990). The proposed Aviation Medicine
Program commits $10 million dollars in 1991 and $10 million dollars in 1992 for
drug and alcohol testing research. Id. Representative Tom Lewis explained that
the research program would develop a scientifically valid maximum allowable
level of alcohol in a pilot's bloodstream that does not hinder flight performance.
136 CONG. REC. E3,587-03 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1990) (statement of Rep. Lewis). In
addition, the research should attempt to establish the level of alcohol abuse per-
vading the industry. The bill requires the FAA to initiate this program and to
present a report to Congress in 1992 on its progress. Id.
207 The bills also mandate testing of railroad employees in safety-sensitive posi-
tions. S. 356, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); S. 362, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
208 Enactment of the bills would amend the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49
U.S.C. § 1421 (1988), by adding: "Sec. 613 (a)(l) The Administrator shall, in the
interest of aviation safety, prescribe regulations ...establish[ing] a program
which requires air carriers, and foreign air carriers to conduct preemployment,
reasonable suspicion, random and post-accident testing of airmen [and]
crewmembers . 5..." S  356, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); S. 362, 100th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1987).
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tests for use of alcohol at least once every six months; in-
dividuals abusing alcohol could have an application for a
certificate denied, or the FAA could suspend or revoke a
certificate. 20 9 The proposed Act forbids an individual who
has used alcohol in violation of the law from piloting an
aircraft unless the individual completes the rehabilitation
program prescribed by the bill. 210 Airlines would be re-
quired to provide a rehabilitation program which, at the
very least, identifies the person and the problem while of-
fering treatment to the troubled pilot.2 1t
E. JUSTIFICATION FOR TESTING
Proponents of mandatory and random testing for alco-
hol use, including the DOT and major airlines, justify
their position on a number of preventive and punitive
grounds.2 12 The legislation intends not only to catch
wrong-doers before a tragedy occurs, but it also aims at
deterring individuals from drinking before or during
flight. A short list of the often-provided reasons for test-
ing includes: catching abusers, prevention of abuse, in-
creasing worker productivity, increasing profit, decreasing
2- Id. Section 613(a)(2) and (3) compels the FAA to:
(A) require that any individual referred to in paragraph (1) of this
subsection shall be subject to testing for the use, without lawful au-
thorization, of alcohol and controlled substances not less often than
once every six months;
(B) require the disqualification, dismissal or revocation of any certifi-
cate relating to air transportation issued to such an individual ....
Id.
210 Id. Section 613(b)(2) would prevent an individual from flying an aircraft
"unless such individual has completed a program of rehabilitation" as defined by
a later section. Id.
211 Id. Pursuant to section 613(c)(2), each airline would be required to "estab-
lish and maintain a rehabilitation program which at a minimum provides for the
identification and opportunity for treatment of [pilots] ... in need of assistance in
resolving problems with the use of alcohol or controlled substances." Id. Major
airlines already offer successful treatment programs under the HIMS model. For
a discussion of the HIMS program, see supra notes 105-108 and accompanying
text.
212 Airline and Rail Service Protection Act: Hearing on S. 356 and S. 362 Before the
Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987)
(statement by Sen. Hollings, Chairman, Comm. on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation) [hereinafter Hollings' Statement].
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absenteeism, decreasing bad decisions, protection of the
abuser's health, and enhancing public perception of the
industry.2
Although proposed legislation provides for four types
of testing, random testing sparks the most controversy.
Those individuals advocating stringent random proce-
dures maintain that such procedures promise the only
practical method of preventing alcohol use from being a
contributing factor in an aviation accident. 2 4 To support
the contention that random testing works, members of the
Senate offer empirical evidence in comparable safety-sen-
sitive industries.21 For instance, the Coast Guard began
random testing in 1983. It reports a significant drop in
the number of individuals testing positive for substance
abuse.21 6 The Department of Defense also randomly tests
its employees, and its positive test results decreased from
27% in 1980 to 4.8% in 1988.17
F. OPPOSITION TO TESTING
It is difficult to find a group categorically opposed to all
forms of alcohol testing. The major airlines and air pilot
associations favor testing prior to employment, when
probable cause exists, and when the pilot attends rehabili-
tation.2 "8 Random testing, however, remains reprehensi-
ble to many members of the aviation community.
213 Dealing with Drugs, supra note 19, at 86-87. Stone and Masters point out that
the justifications listed in their report are particularly well-suited to the reasoning
behind screening or random testing.
214 135 CONG. REC. S 15,403-01 (daily ed. Nov. 9, 1989) (statement of Sen. Hol-
lings). Senator Hollings is "convinced that random testing is the only practical
means or preventing ... alcohol use from being a factor in ... airline accidents."
Id.
215 Id. (statement of Sen. Danforth).
216 Id. In 1988, the Coast Guard recorded a drop from 10.3% to 2.8% of its
employees testing positive.
217 Id.
211 Airline and Rail Service Protection Act: Hearings on S.356 and S.362 Before the Sen-
ate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1987)
(statement of Richard Stone, Executive Chairman, Aeromedical Research, Air
Line Pilots Association). "[L]et me tell you that we are in agreement with the
committee that there should be some form of testing in the industry." Id.
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The ALPA has established the most cogent opposition
to random testing of its pilots.2 19 The organization pro-
vides five reasons for its position. First, the ALPA main-
tains that such testing is inefficient. 220 The pilots contend
that since random testing only looks at an individual one
or two times annually, such testing is unnecessary because
the industry's HIMS alcohol program monitors individu-
als twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week.22' Sec-
ond, the unreliability of the tests threatens innocent pilots
whose careers may potentially be destroyed by a false pos-
itive. 2 Third, employers might use random testing to
terminate those employees whom they consider problem-
atic. 3 Fourth, financially strapped airlines may use
random testing not as merely one element of a compre-
hensive prevention program but as the entire sum of it.22 4
Under that scenario, rehabilitation would become a pro-
gram of the past.
Finally, ALPA insists that random testing violates the
Fourth Amendment of the Constitution.2 5 Serious ques-
tions regarding the constitutionality of the FAA's random
drug testing program arose soon after its initiation. Ran-
dom testing, however, survived claims that it violates the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Ninth Circuit
upheld the FAA's regulation after balancing workers' per-
sonal rights and air safety in six consolidated cases.2 26
Specifically, the Ninth Circuit conceded the intrusiveness
of such testing, particularly when the testing is performed
randomly. Nevertheless, the court concluded that the in-
trusiveness was "insufficient to tip the scale against the
[FAA's] drug testing program. '2 2 7 The Ninth Circuit held
219 Id. at 76-77.






226 Random Testing for Airline Employees is Upheld by Federal Appeals Court, AIR
SAFETY WK., July 16, 1990, at 3.
227 Id.
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that the Administration's interest in the promotion of air
safety outweighed the aviation workers' Fourth Amend-
ment right to freedom from unreasonable searches and
seizures.228
V. CONCLUSION
Although the rules promulgated by the FAA and Con-
gress represent an attempt to prohibit pilots from flying
while intoxicated, the aggregate of these rules potentially
fail in many respects. They may fail to adequately identify
alcohol abusers in commercial and general aviation, fail to
authorize airport personnel to prevent an intoxicated pi-
lot from flying, fail to provide a standard by which a court
can convict an intoxicated pilot, and fail to motivate a pi-
lot with an alcohol problem to come forward and enter a
rehabilitation program.
Those specific shortcomings should be addressed by
the FAA and Congress in a comprehensive piece of legis-
lation. Such legislation should delineate the maximum al-
lowable alcohol concentration prior to flight and should
expand the time frame between consumption and take-off
in general aviation to the number of hours already re-
quired by many commercial carriers. Furthermore, Con-
gress and the pilots' associations must reach a
compromise regarding alcohol testing, and the govern-
ment should be sensitive to the problems of self-testing
and self-enforcement in general aviation. Finally, air traf-
fic controllers and flight inspectors should be federally au-
thorized to detain an aircraft if its pilot appears
intoxicated, otherwise the real danger of mixing alcohol
and aviation will not be averted.
The FAA, Congress, airline pilots groups, and the pub-
lic agree that an alcohol-free cockpit is vital to safe trans-
portation. Rather than promulgating a series of
additional, more invasive, and yet potentially ineffective
rules, increasing the effectiveness of existing regulations
228 Id.
[57
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presents the best solution to curb the abuse of alcohol by
pilots.
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